Not Pooping Weigh More

Review of a fragment of Republic-VII

Plato, Republic, Book VII, 511c-511d (Version Conrado Eggers Lan)
understand, but not enough, because I think you have in mind an enormous task: to distinguish what you want as real and intelligible is studied by science dialectic , stating that it is clearer than that studied by the so-called 'arts', for which the assumptions are principles. And that students are forced to study by means of discursive thought , but not by the senses. But due to not making progress towards a first test but from assumptions, you seem to have no intelligence about them albeit with intelligible principle. And I think you call ` discursive thought 'the mental state of the surveyors and the like, but the` intelligence', as if the ` discursive thought 'was something between opinion and intelligence.

C o m e n t a r i o

Once placed the text in its historical context we proceeded to highlight some of the terms that we understand may have a greater interest in both express with clarity some of the ideas characteristic of the Platonic doctrine. In this case, given the epistemological nature of text, are those terms that allow us to more confidently refer to some of the most characteristic elements of the Platonic theory of knowledge (I could not be otherwise since in such a short text could hardly find terms from which we can reflect to the full knowledge of the doctrine of Plato, that is, moreover, a very complex doctrine).

We believe these terms

good they could be those of 'understood', 'science of dialectics' (very similar to the first in the text and in the Platonic doctrine), and the term' discursive thought. " The latter, 'discursive thought' appears three times, while the term 'understood', while directly related to the term 'intelligence' (that is intelligible that of which you can have intelligence) appears four. We think it is interesting to note that these terms are referred to as such, ie as terms in one hand and in the same sentence that distinguishes each other. Specifically one in which Plato writes "I think you call` discursive thought 'the mental state of the surveyors and the like, but the `intelligence' ." This would justify those single quotes that appear in the text by the translator's decision. In any case it is interesting to note how in that sentence in which these two terms appear as intended by the author is separate or distinguish the 'discursive thought' the fact of intelligence seen in a more general. This should not be construed as an attempt to oppose each other, if anything to distinguish them as the 'discursive thought' in the Platonic doctrine does not exhaust the possible knowledge or "intelligence" that could be reality, but is only one phase of it: a phase in which the formal (as eidetic) begins to highlight. We believe that when Plato writes that the 'discursive thought' is referable " the mental state of the surveyors and the like " which is trying to do is make it clearer with this example, the formal (eidetic) that this stage of knowledge. In another previous sentence, we also see quite clearly intended to distinguish this 'discursive thought' other upstream (and lower scope) of knowledge. We refer the sentence in which the purpose of the principles (not the 'assumptions' that are only beginning to call 'art') Plato writes that "those who study are forced to study by means of discursive thought, but senses not. " So that discursive thought is the beginning of this phase epistemic more rigorous and reliable knowledge that will leave behind those other times false beliefs (eikasía) or only probable conjectures (pistis) to get into the higher stages of knowledge those which lead us to the truth: dianoia (discursive thinking), and finally and as noesis horizon or contemplating the eide.

Despite its shortness this text is very dense and rich in nuances. Hardly have time now to refer to another term that we meant to be particularly interesting in relation to the Platonic epistemology: the 'science of dialectics. " We had pointed out the relationship between the content of the terms' inteligible'-'inteligencia 'and the term' science of dialectics. " The explanation of this relationship can not be found explicitly in the text, but in Plato's doctrine in its epistemological aspect: is dialectical any time when there is a move towards knowledge, having now some denial (which is exceeded, the thing that intelligence is not resigned: the false assumptions) and some claim (what is said , if only as a goal: the knowledge of the truth from the approach to the principles on which it is claimed).

This dialectical character is permeating the entire text under discussion, as the highlight of the same idea, in our opinion, is that knowledge is a process, that this process approach to the principles is the ultimate goal and that " distinguish what's real intelligible "are things that are constituted as objects of our knowledge is the ultimate goal for our ability to reason.

To conclude our analysis we can say that, despite its shortness, are present in it a short but important set of proposals epistemological order. Namely: that the science of the dialectic is interested in making intelligible realities, at first, can not seem (to not appear 'understandable'); that this progress of reason to the inteligilidad plays a major role that 'discursive thought' That dianoia , and that this involves a process of alienation of opinions and, perhaps, of the principles established in earlier phases of this development (sensitive phase) and an approach to the eidetic dimension of reality, the closest to the truth.